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The paper tries to derive lessons from the UK experience with inflation targeting (IT) for the
Czech monetary policy. Reasons for introducing the IT in both countries have been very
similar. After intermediate targets failed, both central banks searched for a new strategy.
When implementing the IT scheme, their approaches have been very similar although in
some cases different tools have been implemented in order to overcome generally
recognized problems. For example, flexibility has been gained by reduction in targeted
index in the Czech case while explicit exemptions have been introduced in the UK case. The
UK experience with the IT shows that inflation might be reduced towards targeted level
faster than expected. Some other policy dilemmas from the UK experience appear relevant
for the Czech central bank. For example, due to exchange-rate appreciation, domestically
produced inflation might exceed aggregate inflation. The paper also concentrates on role of
forecasting in the IT framework.
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In 1998, the Czech National Bank (CNB) introduced inflation targeting (IT). The aim of this
paper was to compare the Czech approach to the IT to the one of the UK and to analyse the
UK ten-year experience with this strategy in order to derive lessons for the Czech monetary
policy for which the IT is a new method of ensuring final objective.
It has been interesting to see that although the two economies are different, main reason for
introducing the IT scheme was similar. Intermediate targets failed. Domestic currency
recovered from speculative attack. Financial innovations destabilised traditional monetary
links. In the Czech case, the strategies based on intermediate targets were more short-lived
than in the UK case since some features of transition increased size of various standard
shocks. In both cases, there was a need to design a strategy of reaching final objective of
monetary policy effectively.
It is worth noting that institutional frameworks differed. In the UK, an introduction of the IT
framework has increased independency of the central bank. The central bank has been given
operational independence to reach the inflation targets specified by the UK government. The
central bank has been also given mechanisms for explaining its policy such as open letter to
the Chancellor. In the Czech case, the central bank was independent prior to the introduction
of the IT. By announcing inflation targets, the central bank realized higher degree of
independence. This move has been balanced by a “voluntary” significant increase in
transparency. Hence the outcome has been similar. Both central banks started producing
inflation reports and minutes of the meeting.
In order to cope with uncertainty, both central banks introduced two mechanisms although
the relative emphasis put on them was different. Firstly, general price index has been
reduced for the purposes of target specification. In the Czech case, the reduction was more
significant than in the UK case. Secondly, target has been specified in an interval form. In
the Czech case, the interval was narrower with respect to the central value. In addition to
that, the UK approach also involved a possibility to use mechanism of exemptions. A
careful design of these mechanisms suggests that both central banks probably preferred
gains credibility to fast anchoring of inflation expectations.4
Since both frameworks are similar and the UK experience with the IT scheme is much
longer, the review of outcomes and discovered policy dilemmas could suggest what is ahead
of the Czech monetary policy. In the UK, the IT was effective in reducing inflation.
Inflation reports indicate that the IT was more effective than expected. Inflation converged
to medium-term target faster than it was designed by the initial documents. Among policy
dilemmas, the problem of sterling appreciation is probably most relevant for the Czech
monetary policy. During the analysed period, there was a need for increase in rates due to
increasing domestic demand and fast money growth. However, appreciation of domestic
currency outweighed domestic inflation pressures. Inflation forecasts signalled that the
target would be hit.
One part of the research concentrated on role of forecasting in the IT framework. It was very
important for the CNB to extend the knowledge on how to use forecasting under its new
strategy. According to the UK experience, two major roles can be distinguished.  Internally,
forecasting becomes a key activity for both policy discussions as well as decisions.
Externally, forecast visualises the decision-making process for general public. It can help
explaining two important features of decision-making process: the forward-looking nature
and uncertainty.1
1. Introduction
In 1998, the Czech National Bank (CNB) introduced inflation targeting (IT) as its new
monetary strategy. The aim of this paper was to provide background for the Czech policy
makers on the UK experience with IT. Two main questions determined the content of
research. Are the two strategies similar? What can be ahead of the CNB according to longer
UK experience?
Firstly, main reasons for introducing the IT scheme in the UK and Czech Republic were
compared. Interestingly, the reasons look very similar although the two economies are at
different stages of development. In both case studies, unreliability of intermediate target was
important factor during a search for new strategy. Domestic currency was under attack and
money aggregates were subject to financial innovations.
Secondly, the announcement of the new framework in these two countries was analysed. On
one hand, there is one important difference in institutional framework. Unlike in the UK
framework, the CNB has set inflation target itself. On the other hand, there is common
feature to work with two time horizons when announcing the first target. This is a
consequence of necessity to reduce inflation in both economies although the problem has
been more serious in the Czech case.
Thirdly, several important characteristics of implementation of the IT strategy were
compared. There is a similar approach to eliminating contra-productive reaction of
monetary policy. Some items have been excluded from the general price index in order to
prevent these reactions. It is worth noting that while in the UK case monetary strategy
defines its key inflation target for long run, in the Czech case it is defined for medium run.
Fourthly, the UK experience with new procedures that have been implemented after the IT
framework was introduced was described. Specifically, the role of the MPC was analysed.
Also, the newly introduced documents such as inflation reports and minutes of the meeting
as well as forecasting activities were described. This summary suggested what potential
impact on the Czech monetary policy the IT scheme could have in next few years.
Fifthly, results of targeting inflation in the UK for nearly decade were examined. Within the
examined period, inflation was reduced to targeted range faster than expected. The UK the2
economy was growing at satisfactory growth rates. Some dilemmas of monetary policy are
mentioned such as sterling appreciation or slowly accommodating inflation expectations.
The review indicated what problems could be faced by the Czech central bank while
targeting inflation.
The last part of the paper concentrates on role of forecasting in the IT framework. It was
very important for the CNB to extend the knowledge on how to use forecasting under its
new strategy. According to the UK experience, two major roles can be distinguished.
Internally, forecasting becomes a key activity for both policy discussions as well as
decisions. Externally, it visualises the decision-making process for general public. It stresses
two important features of decision-making process: the forward-looking nature and
uncertainty.
2. Main reasons for introducing the IT strategy
The UK and the Czech experience are similar as far as reasons for introducing the IT
framework are concerned. Their experience corresponds to the one of other inflation
targeters that typically introduced the IT after collapse of the exchange-rate regime or when
monetary aggregates failed as intermediate targets
1.
In the UK, monetary targeting was abandoned in 1986 after financial innovations had
distorted a link between intermediate target and prices. Then the Deutsche mark was
shadowed. Formal exchange-rate target was accepted in 1990. In 1992, the ERM was
suspended after a massive attack against pound
2, and an explicit inflation target was
introduced in September.
In the Czech case, the experience was quite similar although the alternative strategies were
implemented for shorter periods. The Czech monetary policy relied on intermediate targets
since beginning of transition towards market economy. In the period of 1993-1995, the
koruna was pegged to a basket of currencies. At the same time, money growth was used as
complementary target. After an introduction of full convertibility of koruna, the two
intermediate targets became incompatible. Hence in 1996, exchange-rate bands were
                                                
1 See Haldane (1997) for summary of typical reasons of introducing the inflation target.
2 See Bowen (1995) for description of reasons of why the IT has been introduced in the UK case.3
widened and intervention on the foreign exchange market became rare. The target for
money growth gained significance. In May 1997, after the exchange-rate turbulence
3, the
koruna was let to float. Then the IT framework was introduced in December 1997.
Both the UK as well as the Czech experience suggests that intermediate targets lose their
value when they get to contradiction with the ultimate objective of monetary policy. Under
some conditions, price stability is ensured although money grows out of target ranges. For
example, this was the case of the financial innovations in the UK.  In the Czech case, capital
inflow attracted by privatisation together with financial innovations brought by transition
distorted the link between money and other variables
4.
It also happened that inflation was out of control while the exchange-rate target was met.
Specifically, this was the experience of both countries when prices in non-tradable sector
grew faster than prices in tradable sector. Also, in both economies, inflation expectations
were not in line with long-term goal of monetary policy under fixed-rate regime
5. To sum
up, the IT was evaluated as a strategy superior to monetary framework that relied on
intermediate target since it was directly derived from final objective of monetary policy.
3. The announcement of the IT framework
In the UK case, the IT framework was adopted by the UK government in October 1992
6.
The government defined the new inflation target in a form of horizontal band (1-4%) for
medium-term. The long-term goal has been specified as follows: to keep inflation on 2% or
                                                
3 For more information on the May exchange rate turbulence see Šmídková  (1998).
4 One could argue that for a transitional country the probability of financial innovations is relatively
larger than for a developed economy. For example, the opening of capital account and liberalisation
of financial markets increased importance of capital flows. The institutional features of financial
markets went through profound changes within a relatively short time span. Moreover, the new
financial assets, new types of transactions and new market players emerged during transition.
5 Again, one could argue that economy in transitional is more prone to problem of non-falling
inflation under fixed exchange rate. This is due to a necessity to de-regulated prices that were
administered under previous regime.
6 See Bowen (1995) for description of how the IT framework has been implemented in the UK.4
less
7. Both targets were specified in terms of twelve months increase in RPIX. This is the
retail price index from which mortgage interest payments are excluded. Given the current
inflation rate in 1992, the medium-term target implied objective for monetary policy to
bring inflation down. However, significant flexibility was left on the speed of approaching
the long-term target.
At the same time, both previously used intermediate targets were officially rejected. There
was, however, the underlying perspective of re-entry to the EMU after achieving monetary
convergence. It was explained that previously used intermediate targets were not
appropriate to steer monetary policy in the correct directions in all circumstances. The
previously used intermediate targets were viewed as useful indicators that would be
evaluated together with other information in order to produce inflation outlooks.
In the Czech case, the IT  framework  was implemented in  December 1997. It had two
important features similar to the ones of the UK framework. Two targets were announced
for one-year and three-year horizons. After the Board meeting on December 21, the
commitment was declared that net inflation would be 6% ±0.5% by the end of 1998 and
4.5% ±1% by the end of the year 2000. Targets were explicitly specified in terms of net
inflation. Net inflation is measure derived from consumer price index by excluding effects
of corrections in administered prices and changes in indirect taxes.
Similarly to the UK case, previously used intermediate targets were rejected but their
importance as useful indicators was stressed
8. The IT framework was explained as a new
strategy of monetary policy that allowed for policy makers to rely on much broader set of
information when producing inflation outlooks. Since the Czech Republic had started
negotiating with the EU, the similar underlying perspective of entry to the EMU after
achieving monetary convergence was present in the Czech case.
                                                
7 According to the UK Inflation Reports, the medium-term target was extended to 1-2.5% in June
1995. In May 1997, the long-term target was set to 2.5% since the previous statement gave some
ambiguity that there was no floor to targeted rate of inflation. Consequently, the interval target was
replaced with a point target.
8 See Inflation Report, Czech National Bank, April 1998.5
What was common to both cases of announcement of the IT framework? First, there was a
clear shift in priorities from importing low inflation via fixed exchange rate towards viewing
the EMU as a final stage of monetary regime. Second, the IT frameworks in both countries
work with two time horizons although horizons are longer in the UK case (medium and
long-term) than in the Czech case (short and medium-term). In both cases, inflation targets
have been announced for reduced headline inflation index. However, modifications of index
have not been the same. They reflected different reasons for excluding some items.
And what were the differences in both approaches to the IT introduction? Interestingly, in
the UK case, there was only a very short time period between the two subsequent monetary
regimes. It took one month to announce the IT framework after the EMR was left. In the
Czech case, there was more time to prepare implementation of the new strategy. It took
eight months to announce the targets after the exchange-rate bands were abolished.
The major difference between the two approaches was in their institutional backgrounds. In
the UK case, the support of the government given to the IT framework was active
9 from its
beginning since it was the government that declared inflation targets. In the Czech case, the
central bank itself introduced the IT strategy although the targets were informally consulted
with the Ministry of Finance (MF). The government support was not active. On the
contrary, in 1998, inflation forecasts of the MF were higher than target of the central bank.
It is worth noting that although in both countries the introduction of the IT was aimed at
disinflation, the long-term target was specified only in the UK case. Its value has been
derived from domestic fundamentals such as estimates of inflation measurement errors
10.
However, in the Czech case, the terminal point for disinflation path was not announced in
1997. One of the important reasons was that for a small open economy it was relatively
more difficult to rely on domestic fundamentals. In some sense, the long-term target is a
moving target due to a significant dependence on inflation of major trading partners.
                                                
9 The active and passive support is distinguished in Ben-Bassat (1995). According to this definition,
the active support means that implemented fiscal and wage policies support inflation target.
10 The fact that the IT has been implemented as a framework based on domestic indicators of
economic performance is stressed for example in King  (1994).6
4. Defining the inflation objective
The important feature of the IT framework is that it works with an explicit inflation
objective. When defining the objective, policy makers are faced with the four problems: (i)
which index to choose, (ii) what the speed should be of approaching target, (iii) what the
value of target is, and (iv) how wide should the targeted interval be. In the following
paragraphs, the UK and the Czech approaches to these four issues are compared
11.
 
In the UK case, the target is specified in terms of RPIX that excludes interest/mortgage
payments from the RPI (retail price index). The interest-rate related items are excluded from
the index since they are directly affected with the official rates and would send contradicting
signals of increased inflation after rates are raised. The targeted index measured by the
institution that is independent from the central bank (Central statistical office).
Internally, the Bank of England uses the RPIY inflation that excludes indirect and local
authority taxes as a proxy for underlying inflation as well as several measures of
domestically generated inflation (GDI). It follows that although the targeted index (RPIX) is
very close to the headline index (RPI), the Bank of England uses narrower measures for the
policy purposes. However, the changes in the targeted index have not been considered due
to a risk of damaged credibility.
In the Czech case, the target has been defined in term of the net inflation that has been
introduced together with the IT framework in order to exclude transitional price shocks such
as price corrections (and changes in indirect taxes) from targeted index
12. The net inflation
                                                
11 Comparison is based on Inflation Reports of the Bank of England (February 1993-November
1998), and  Inflation Reports of the Czech National Bank (April 1998 –November 1998).
12 The consumer basket was adjusted for items with regulated prices and prices affected by other
administrative measures. According to this definition, the net inflation index represents
approximately 82% of the consumer price index. The list of items excluded from the consumer
basket has been defined as follows: prices regulated by the Ministry of Finance or local authorities
(weight in CPI is 7.4%); prices affected by other administrative measures (weight in CPI is 6%);
administrative fees (weight in CPI is 4.4%). In addition, the net inflation itself filters out an impact
of changes in indirect taxes or subsidies.7
index is calculated for the purposes of inflation targeting by the Czech statistical office that
is independent from the central bank.
Internally, the Czech National Bank uses other price indices as leading indicators of net
inflation. For example, the inflation in tradable and non-tradable sectors is often analysed.
The core inflation is used as an indicator of domestically generated inflation. On the
contrary to the UK case, the index targeted by the Czech central bank is relatively more
distant from the headline index. Hence the need to use narrower measures for the policy
purposes is smaller. Instead there is a need to use different sub-indices of the CPI to gain
more information.
As far as the speed of approaching the target is concerned, in the UK case, the speed of
approaching the long-term target that formally
13 holds for indefinite future was not
specified. The medium term horizon was approximated with the end of the Parliament
appointed at the time of introducing the IT. In the Czech case, the speed of approaching the
medium-term target was defined with the slope of disinflation path implied by the two
targets. However, since the long-term objective has not been specified in terms of net
inflation
14, the uncertainty about the speed of approaching it was relatively higher than in
the UK case.
It has been already mentioned that the level of the target is relatively more easily determined
for larger and relatively less open economies because domestic fundamentals provide
sufficient information. In the UK case, the level of long-term target has been derived from
objective of price stability under condition that there are various statistical biases. These
imply a need to target a positive inflation rate of order 0.5-1.5%
15. According to the
estimates for the UK economy, there is a product substitution bias of order 0.05-0.1%, outlet
substitution bias of order 0.1-0.25%, quality adjustment bias of order 0.2-0.3%, and   new-
goods bias of order 0.0-0.15%. Moreover, there are studies suggesting that targeting zero
inflation would impose constraint on real interest rates.
                                                
13 The inflation target needs to be confirmed with the each budget.
14 According to the Bank law, the ultimate goal of monetary policy is currency stability (both
external as well as internal).
15 For a summary of this problem see King (1994) and Haldane (1995). For analysis of different
types of measurement bias see Cunningham (1996).8
In the Czech case, the value of long-run target has not been specified. Medium-term target is
relatively higher (4.5%) than the one in the UK framework (2.5%)
16. This difference is a
consequence of different stages of the disinflation process. Inflation was higher in the Czech
case when the IT framework was introduced. The Czech economy started with the net
inflation of 7.5% in 1998. The UK inflation (measured by RPIX) was in 3.7% in 1993. This
implied that the targeted inflation rate should be reduced by 40% in the Czech case and by
30% in the UK case in medium run. Moreover, the above-mentioned biases and
uncertainties are probably much higher in economy in transition. Hence the objective of
price stability is consistent with higher rate of measured inflation in the medium term.
According to the theory of inflation targeting, the higher size of shocks that are likely to hit
the economy in between the setting of policy and its impact on inflation, the wider the
targeted interval should be.  An alternative solution to wider band is targeting of a narrower
sub-index. In the UK case, targeted price index was relatively broad. The width of the
interval was 40% of the target value. In the Czech case, the targeted price index is narrower.
The width of the interval was 20% of the target value.
Hence the interval was narrower in the Czech case despite the fact that uncertainty was
probably larger in economies in transition. The problem was to some extend reduced by
targeting narrower index. Also, there was a recognised trade-off between flexibility and
credibility
17. The wider band would reduce credibility due to a danger of inflation bias
towards the upper band. This would be probably more costly for the Czech central bank that
faced a problem of unstable inflation expectations due to transitional problems.
Different approach towards dealing with uncertainty was apparent in use of exemptions. In
the UK case, the principle of exemptions was explicitly introduced during the initial stage of
the IT. The central bank has been given a possibility to explain the short-term deviations
                                                
16 Due to differences in definition of targeted indices, the Czech target is relatively less ambitious
than suggested by the two numbers.
17 Overview on how to define the width of interval is given in King (1994). The comparison of two
strategies -exemptions versus wider bands – is analysed in Haldane (1995). Other studies give
different reasons for exemptions or caveats. See Bowen (1995), Ben-Bassat (1995).9
from target in the case of large shock by writing a letter to the Chancellor
18.  In the Czech
case, in the initial stage of the IT preference was given to narrow targeted index.
5. The UK experience with implementing new procedures
The UK experience gives a lot of information on which types of procedures are necessary to
implement after the inflation targeting is introduced. In the UK case, the inflation targeting
scheme went trough two stages. During the first stage, the Bank of England had neither
target nor operational independence. King (1994) describes the original institutional
framework as follows. The process of reaching judgement on interest rate policy started
with an informal assessment of the economic situation..
The assessment was exchanged between the Treasury and the Bank that acted as advisor in
the matter of monetary policy Then there was a joint meeting between senior Bank and
Treasury officials. The minutes of the meeting included summary of discussion reported
anonymously with the Governor’s introduction, the Chancellor’s summing-up and decision.
The irreversibility of the decision to publish the minutes was underlined by the
announcement by the shadow Chancellor that he would continue to publish them.
Irrespectively of the lack of independence of the central bank, there was a visible switch to
more forward-looking monetary policy that according to Bowen (1995) did not any more
react to the current rate of inflation. Monetary policy started maximising probability,
estimated at the time of the policy adjustment, of inflation falling within the target range by
the time adjustment has taken effect.
In the second stage, the Bank was given independence by The Bank of England Act from
spring 1998. The system started operating de facto when the Chancellor announced the new
scheme in his letter to the Governor in May 1997
19.  This change was viewed as the most
important one since nationalisation in 1946. It promoted independence of monetary
decisions from political cycle. With the independent central bank, there was a need to define
                                                
18 See Bowen (1995) for explanation of the role of the letters.
19 See Letter from the Chancellor to the Governor: 6 May 1997 and The Chancellor’s  Statement on
the Bank of England: 20 May 1997.10
objectives of monetary policy in a transparent way as well as to define procedures for the
case of missing the target
20.
In the remit for monetary policy
21, objectives are defined for the Bank to maintain price
stability and subject to that support economic policy of government. It is important to note
that price stability is understood as precondition for high and stable levels of growth and
employment. The price stability is defined as RPIX inflation rate of 2 and ½ per cent. It is
also said that the aim is not to have this inflation rate for several months but to have
expectations of inflation settled on this level. The remit will be restated with each budget.
Hence inflation target need to be confirmed with each budget although in the initial remit it
is stressed that continuity is valued high.
The procedures relevant for the case of missing the target are defined as follows. Thresholds
are used of one per cent deviation from the target. It is clearly explained that the target is a
point
22.  Mechanism of exemptions is introduced. In the occurrence of external events or
temporary difficulties actual inflation will occasionally depart from its target and attempts to
keep inflation close to target in these circumstances would cause undesirable volatility in
output.
In 1997, the Bank gained new structure
23. The Bank of England Act provides a statutory
basis for the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) that has been given responsibility for
formulating and implementing monetary policy. The MPC consists of nine members:
                                                
20 See Briault, Haldane, King (1996) for explanation of independence and accountability problem.
They state that accountability is important if the bank is independent. It is necessary to have clearly
defined contract in order to be accountable. It requires to specify the duty as well as how its
fulfilment would be monitored, and which penalty would be imposed for non-compliance.
Otherwise, the contract is incomplete. It is argued that independence of central bank imposes
constraint on political inference. Accountability imposes constraint on how the bank exercises its
independence.
21 See Remit for the Monetary Policy Committee from June 3, 1998.
22 Should inflation move away from the target by more than one percentage point, open letter from
the Governor to the Chancellor will give reasons and details of policy actions being taken to bring
inflation back and the period within which it is expected to return to target.
23 See Rodgers (1998) for explanation of internal changes within the Bank of England.11
Governor, two deputy Governors (monetary policy, financial stability), two Bank executives
(appointed by the Bank after consultation with the chancellor who are responsible for
monetary analysis and for monetary operations), and four external members (appointed by
the chancellor who must be experts in monetary policy and become employees of the Bank).
The MPC members are appointed on rolling basis in order to ensure continuity of decisions.
Each member has one vote, the Governor has the second casting vote.  The Treasury
representative may attend the meeting and speak but s/he has no vote.
After the Bank was given independence, monthly frequency of the monetary decisions has
been maintained. However, the decision making process has changed. The new internal
procedures have been implemented together with the new methodology of assessing
economic situation and with the new approach towards the public that has promoted
transparency of monetary policy significantly
24.
In the centre of decision making process are quarterly inflation reports
25. Interestingly, the
MPC is responsible under legislation for approving every Inflation report
26. The MPC is
involved in quarterly assessment of economic situation in which the major assumptions are
formulated for the official inflation forecast
27. However, theoretically it is possible in the
case of major disagreement for the MPC to have several forecasts, each reflecting the
opinion of several MPC members. This situation has not occurred yet since consensus on
major trends and risks has been always reached so far.
                                                
24 According to various speeches published in Quarterly bulletins, this increase in openness was
welcomed both by public as well as opposition parties.
25 They were introduced during the first stage of inflation targeting. The first Inflation report
was produced in February 1993. The reports are published quarterly. They are supplemented with
Quarterly bulletins that contain description of recent economic developments, research papers of the
Bank experts, and speeches by the MPC members.
26 This holds also with respect towards the general public since each report is signed by the MPC
members.
27 See Budd (1998), Vickers (1998) and also The Governor’s Speech on Objectives and Current
State of Monetary Policy (1998).12
The produced forecast provides a framework for policy discussion as well as for the
structure of more detailed economic analysis by sectors or segments of the economy
28. It
serves as a benchmark for “interim” monthly meetings during which the news are
distinguished from noise. Then the validity of the previously made assumptions is
evaluated. In the case of some major news, quarterly economic outlook is corrected and
decision to act is taken. During the monthly assessments, various types of information are
used (from the theoretical model frameworks and inflation forecasts to regional information
gathered by the twelve regional Agents) in order to make policy decision.
The quarterly assessment of economic situation is provided to public by publishing the
Inflation reports. They review a wide range of data and assess inflation prospect over the
short to medium term. The Bank’s projection for inflation and output for next two years is
presented on fan charts. The projections are always based on assumption of unchanged
official interest rates. The description of various risks is published, including their
asymmetries. By admitting the uncertainty to public, the transparency of decision-making
process becomes higher. The Reports also summarise forecasts by other institutions as well
that estimates of  inflation  expectations.
As the second vehicle of transparency, the minutes of the monthly MPC meetings are
published two weeks after the meeting takes place
29. The minutes are structured analogously
to the discussion of the MPC. There are regular sections describing recent economic
developments, current state of the economy, economic outlook and its risks, forecasts by
other institutions, policy implications of the outlook, immediate policy decision, results of
the voting with names, and list of members present at the meeting. In addition, some topical
issues are covered as well such as fiscal developments, appreciation of sterling and
commodity prices.
                                                
28 The role of forecast is described more in the last section. It is important to note that a focus on
inflation forecasting required changes inside the Bank (in the structure of both human capital as well
as activities of the Bank´s analysts).
29 The time lag between the meeting and publishing the minutes shortened significantly when the
inflation targeting was introduced. Since 1994, the minutes were published six weeks after the
meeting  (until 1998). Prior to 1994,  the lag was thirty years.13
In order to inform public extensively about the view on the economy, the speeches by the
MPC members given at various occasions are published in the Quarterly bulletins. Their
publications provide further information of views of policy makers on monetary policy as
well as more general economic problems. For example, some speeches respond to
opponents of the IT framework and explain important parts of the strategy such as the role
of the forecast. In addition to this, all issued press notes are included in Inflation reports
together with Minutes.
6. The UK experience with effectiveness of the IT
The UK experience with the effectiveness of the IT framework is described in Inflation
reports. Also, speeches of the MPC members and research papers in Quarterly bulletins give
a lot of information
30. Chart 1 shows the UK inflation record in the period of 1993-1998.
Since 1993 inflation remained in a range of 2-3.5%. This record corresponds by historical
standards to high degree of price stability. Over the same period, average output growth was
around 3%.




















































































Source: Bank of England, Inflation reports.
                                                
30 See for example Vickers (1998).14
It is interesting to note that the new strategy was already successful in the first period of the
IT scheme. Bowen (1995) reports that lower half of the targeted range was reached quite
fast. Inflation converged into targeted range in October 1992. From March 1994 to
December 1994 it was within the lower half of the range. It means that inflation was
reduced from 4.2% in August 1992 to 2.0% in  October 1994
31. In period of 1995-1998, it
fluctuated between 2,5 and 3%.
Chart 2 compares inflation forecasts that were published in Inflation reports  to  observed
values of inflation. Bowen (1995) observes that improvement of forecasting activities was
significant and that this activity was given a lot of emphasis during decision-making
process. During the initial stage of the IT, the observed inflation tended to be lower than
forecasts. However, this mistake was common to all modellers. It was a consequence of to
positive supply shock as well as underestimated influence of falling inflation expectations.
In the latter stage, expectations, forecasts and actual values of inflation were closely related.
Chart 2 also illustrates that the UK monetary policy was forward-looking in this period.
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Source: Bank of England, Inflation reports.
                                                
31 Since the target was always hit, the facility of open letter was not used in these years.15
In Inflation reports
32, several interesting problems are described. First, although inflation
targeting was successful in the short-term by bringing the inflation to targeted range,
expectations
33 were not in this range. This implied that the process of gaining credibility
was longer than initially expected. This uncertainty was costly for example during wage
bargaining process.
Second, there was an important dilemma for monetary policy concerning the time pattern of
inflation forecast. Forecasted inflation within one-year horizon was close to target.
However, there was an indication of inflation wave implying that the target would be missed
in two-year horizon. Consequently, interest rates were increased but it was difficult to
explain the move towards the general public. To some extent, the difficulty was caused by
the fact that   forecast was several times revised downward during the initial stage of the IT.
Third, in 1996, another important dilemma was apparent. On one hand, domestic demand
and output grew at above-trend rates, and money grew at double-digit rates. On the other
hand, exchange-rate appreciated by 16% in seven months. There was a need for increase in
rates but the target was hit due to the first-round effect of sterling appreciation. Even in this
case, the IT framework was strictly followed and interest rates were increased in response to
domestic demand pressure.
7. The role of forecasting inflation in the UK approach
Many researchers including some MPC members stressed the importance of inflation
forecasts for the IT framework. Budd (1998) states that inflation forecast is implicit in any
monetary policy action or inaction although explicit forecast is not necessary a part of
policy-making in general. Under the IT, producing forecast of inflation has internal and
external reasons.
                                                
32 The summary is based on inflation reports, however other authors consider similar issues as
important.  See for example Bowen (1995).
33  Expectations were measured directly as median of 36 private respondent’s forecasts as well as
indirectly from financial market indicators.16
Internally, forecast activities improve quality of monetary decisions. Budd (1998) argues
that forecast creates a framework for decisions and gives normal ranges within which the
economy will behave taking into account complex interactions in the economy. Moreover, it
gives to the MPC members a common language and brings formal and informal methods
together.
Similarly, Haldane (1995) views forecasting inflation as a key activity for inflation targeter.
The forecast satisfies the requirements on intermediate targets since a change in inflation
forecast should be projected into a change in instrument. Hence requirement on both
controllability as well as predictability is fulfilled. Haldane (1995) also claims that using
forecast of some variable as intermediate target has some costs
34. On the other hand, these
costs should not be attributed to the IT framework because they are implicitly present in
other strategies as well.
The methodology of forecast sets the framework for decision-making process. In the UK
case, the baseline projection is used as a framework for discussion in order to ensure
consistency. The projection specifies important macro-economic relationships as well as
major underlying assumptions about exogenous variables.  Baseline uncertainties of both
equations as well as exogenous variables are derived from historical estimates.
The initial probability distribution can be modified by policy makers with off-model
information and expert judgement. These modified distributions produce final outlook.
Haldane (1997) argues that probability distributions add value in three respects. The
probabilistic nature of forecasting is emphasised. Non-model information enters decision-
making process. Asymmetries in the balance of inflation risks are accounted for.
Although the inflation forecast becomes the key activity under the IT scheme, policy makers
emphasise that there is a difference between producing a forecast and actual policy reaction.
Vickers (1998) shows that policy reaction is not mechanical and cannot be derived from the
                                                
34  According to Haldane (1995), the costs come from both model uncertainties as well as shocks to
projections of exogenous variables. Both factors are imposed by forward-looking mode of economic
assessment.17
forecast since the MPC member use more information than a set of equations and data series
included in an underlying model
35.
Similar arguments are given in Inflation reports
36. It is explained that fan charts are not used
as a mechanical determinant of policy decisions. Forecasts are conditioned on the level of
interest rates and do not include all information available to policy makers. Hence the
projection should not be interpreted as the most likely outcome for inflation. It is stressed
that forecasts by the central bank will always differ from forecasts by private sector that
often use some policy rule. They will also differ from observed values of inflation that are
affected with a sequence of interest rate changes.
Interestingly, as explained in Budd (1998), forecast is produced from available set of model
variables under assumptions that are discussed by the MPC. The MPC uses intuition and
theoretical understanding to decide which particular model is appropriate for thinking about
current circumstances. Also, ad hoc models are developed to explore the implications of
particular developments. In this sense, the UK experience is different from the others since
the forecast is not a staff forecast. In the UK case, policy-makers are committed to the
forecast itself not only to the final decision.
The external role of forecast in the UK case is associated with fan charts.  From
explanations in various Inflation reports
37, one can conclude that the forecasting exercise
has its educational role and promotes transparency of decisions. Specifically, fan charts
clearly demonstrate that monetary policy is forward-looking. Each chart also gives an
                                                
35 Vickers (1998) gives two main reasons for difference between forecast and actual reaction. First,
the core model must be manageable. It consists of a small subset of information (150 variables). The
chart pack discussed on the pre-MPC briefing consists of 500 charts and tables and 1000 of
variables. Information not included in the core model is used in order to create a judgement about
quality of simulations. Second, forecast is conditional on constant rate assumption. It would not be
possible for the MPC to specify its own reaction function. Budd (1998) adds that loss function is not
precisely specified. The target is given but the Chancellor states (in his letter) that if the economy
suffers from external events or temporary difficulties, keeping inflation at the target all the time may
cause undesirable volatility in output. The interpretation of what is undesirable volatility is
subjective to each member of the MPC.
36 See for example Inflation Report, May 1998 or Inflation Report, May 1994.
37 See for example the Minutes of the MPC Meeting on 4-5 March 1998.18
explicit identification of uncertainties. The forecast helps explaining decisions to the public
that can comment on assumptions and outcome of forecasts. This openness gives a
benchmark and allows to judge which event can be classified as shock that hit the economy.
This makes monetary policy in the UK very accountable.
8. Concluding remarks
The comparison of the IT frameworks in the UK and in the Czech Republic shows that there
are similarities. Hence it is useful to analyse the UK experience with the IT strategy since it
can provide several lessons for the Czech central bank that introduced the IT framework
some years later.
Definition of the target itself can offer two tools that might be useful for Czech policy
makers. Firstly, a specification of the long-run target helps to settle inflation expectations on
a targeted level. In the Czech case, a long-run target derived from either definition of
domestic price stability or from the EU definition should be announced explicitly.
Similarly, explicitly specified exemptions would further increase flexibility that is necessary
in short-run in the case of large exogenous shocks. Although in the Czech case, reduced
price index was used for specification of a target and target takes an interval form, these two
mechanisms might not provide enough flexibility because transition and large openness
increase potential size of shocks in the Czech economy.
The UK framework puts a lot of emphasis on a balance between transparency,
accountability and independence of the central bank. In this respect, the CNB produces a
comparable set of documents including minutes of the meeting of the Board. With more
research done about the newly introduced framework, it will be possible to include research
papers about forecasting and other topics into the Czech inflation reports.
The UK experience shows that inflation might be reduced towards level targeted in long-run
faster than expected. One can identify two potential reasons – a positive unexpected price
shock and an unexpectedly fast shift in inflation expectations towards low level. Careful
explanation of the respective roles of inflation targets for different horizons might help to
reduce potential loss of credibility.19
Two policy dilemmas from the UK experience appear relevant for the Czech central bank.
First, it is important to communicate towards general public that there is a time lag between
setting the instrument and a change in inflation. It might happen that an inflation forecast
has a shape of a wave. Hence in the period of falling inflation, there is a need for an increase
in rates due to expected future acceleration in inflation.
The second dilemma is related to the exchange rate. According to the UK experience, it
might happen that a large exchange rate fluctuation makes some sectors to perform
differently. As a consequence, domestically produced inflation would be much higher than
aggregate measure of inflation that is affected by strong domestic currency. In this situation,
the Bank of England reacted to domestic fundamentals.
Forecasting in the IT framework has an additional role. Not only it is used internally, it also
might become a tool for communicating several messages towards the general public. It
demonstrates reaction function of the central bank. Also, it stresses that decision-making
process is forward-looking. The forecast also helps to explain various uncertainties and
policy responses towards them.20
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